Natural resource dependence
Natural resource dependence is a barrier to human progress within the environmental factors. The evidence for it, and the methods proposed to address it, follow.
Dependence on natural resources can slow a country's growth.
Evidence
- The resource curse. Sachs and Warner (2001) documented the "resource curse," in which resource-rich countries often grew more slowly.
- Proposed reasons. Proposed reasons include corruption, conflict, neglect of other industries, and volatile prices.
- Counterexamples. Norway and Botswana are common counterexamples. They point again to institutions.
- Strength. The resource curse is listed among actively debated findings. Later critiques and replications of the original working papers are rated in the strength ratings (Brunnschweiler and Bulte, 2008, Davis, 2013).
- Institutions decide whether resources help or hurt. A study reanalyzed growth in 87 countries from 1965 to 1990. It found that more natural resources were associated with lower income growth where institutions favored "grabbing" (seeking a share of resource rents). Where institutions favored production, more resources were associated with higher growth. The curse did not apply above an institutional quality score of about 0.93 on a 0 to 1 scale. Of the 87 countries, 15 reached that score. This is a cross-country correlation, and institutional quality may itself be shaped by resources (Mehlum et al., 2006).
- Oil discoveries and armed conflict. A study used the timing of giant oilfield discoveries worldwide since 1946, which is hard for governments to control. It found that discoveries raised per capita oil production and exports by up to 50%. The study also found that discoveries increased the incidence of internal armed conflict by about 5 to 8 percentage points. The effect was especially large in countries that had experienced armed conflicts or coups in the decade before the discovery (Lei and Michaels, 2014).
- No long-run curse after discoveries. A study compared countries before and after major resource discoveries since 1950. It used panel methods and synthetic controls (a statistical comparison country built from similar countries). It found that GDP per capita rose after resource extraction began and stayed higher in the long term. The effects were concentrated in non-OECD countries. A later working paper found short-run losses instead. In the five years after giant oil or gas discoveries from 1988 to 2010, growth fell short of forecasts by 0.83 percentage points a year on average. In countries below an institutional quality threshold, the shortfall was 1.35 points. The working paper found no detectable shortfall where institutions were strong (Smith, 2015, Cust and Mihalyi, 2017).
What can be done
Actions rated on the strength-rating scale (A strong and replicated, B solid but limited, C weak or debated, D contested or failed), applied to the specific claim made.
- Context: A meta-analysis of 605 estimates from 43 studies found that about 40% of studies report a negative effect of natural resources on growth, 40% no effect, and 20% a positive effect. The meta-analysis found that support for a "resource curse" is weak once publication bias and study methods are accounted for. It found that results depend on whether studies control for institutional quality (Havranek, Horvath, and Zeynalov, 2016).
- Random audits of how local governments spend public money (B). Brazil's anticorruption program audits municipalities chosen by lottery. Being audited in the past reduced later corruption by 8%. It also raised the chance of later legal action by 20% (Avis, Ferraz, and Finan, 2018). The program covers federal transfers in general, not only resource revenue. The same audit data were used to study electoral accountability and corruption (Ferraz and Finan, 2011).
- Fiscal rules that limit spending of commodity revenue (C). One study covered 57 resource-rich countries from 1976 to 2021. It found fiscal rules were linked to better non-resource budget balances. In oil exporters only, it found the rules were linked to less spending growth after price booms. But compliance gaps were common. For example, Mongolia met its structural deficit ceiling only twice since 2013 (Apeti, Basdevant, and Salins, 2023). Commodity-rich countries with fiscal rules showed a larger shift toward countercyclical policy in the 2000s boom than in the 1970s boom. Countercyclical policy means saving in booms (Céspedes and Velasco, 2014). A meta-analysis of 30 studies on fiscal rules in general found that their apparent constraining effect fell below statistical significance. This happened after correcting for publication bias and for the fact that countries choose to adopt rules (Heinemann, Moessinger, and Yeter, 2018).
- Not shown to work: windfall revenue handed to local governments without added oversight (B). In Brazil, oil-rich municipalities reported higher spending on public goods. But survey and administrative data showed that social transfers, public goods, infrastructure, and household income rose less, "if at all," than the reported spending implied (Caselli and Michaels, 2013). Another study used population cutoffs that set the size of federal transfers. It found that larger transfers increased observed corruption and lowered the average education of mayoral candidates (Brollo et al., 2013).
Proposed and experimental methods
Methods that are proposed, under trial, approved in some places, or tried and then failed. Each shows a stage label and an evidence rating. A stage label shows how far a method has progressed, not whether it works. The stage labels are explained on the environmental factor page.
- Resource dividends paid directly to residents (Approved but not scaled, B). Builds on guaranteed income (see "Learned helplessness and low sense of control" in the psychological factors). Since 1982, Alaska has paid every resident a yearly cash dividend from its Permanent Fund. A synthetic control analysis found no effect on employment and a 1.8 percentage point (17%) rise in part-time work (Jones and Marinescu, 2022). The "Oil to Cash" proposal would put resource windfalls in a transparent ring-fenced fund. It would pay equal scheduled dividends to all citizens. It would also tax part of the dividends to build a tax system that links citizens to government. The authors argue this fits best where resource income is high and corruption is severe (Moss et al., 2015). The proposal has not been tested as proposed, and Mongolia's attempt is described below.
- Sovereign funds to save petroleum revenue (In wide use, contested, B for facts only). Countries put oil and gas revenue in a fund so that spending can be spread over time. In August 2026 the IMF again warned that, with no further reforms, large and persistent deficits would lead "to the depletion of the Petroleum Fund in the late 2030s" (IMF, 2026). This repeated the IMF's 2025 warning, which also said that the economy remains under-diversified (IMF, 2025).
- Not shown to help: Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative membership (In wide use, contested, C). EITI member countries publish what oil, gas, and mining companies pay and what governments receive. Groups that include civil society oversee this. A review found the initiative most successful at becoming a recognized brand and setting reporting standards. The same review found its development effects still unclear (Rustad et al., 2017). A cross-country study found that membership offered "a shielding mechanism" against the tendency of mineral-rich countries to see corruption rise over time (Papyrakis et al., 2017). But synthetic control analyses looked at five early Latin American members (Colombia, Guatemala, Honduras, Peru, and Trinidad and Tobago). These analyses found no substantial reduction in corruption in any of them (Lopez-Cazar et al., 2021).
- Reversed: U.S. rule on disclosure of payments to governments (Failed or reversed, B). Section 1504 of the Dodd-Frank Act required oil, gas, and mining companies listed in the U.S. to disclose payments to governments. Congress overturned the SEC's 2016 rule under the Congressional Review Act. The President signed the resolution on February 14, 2017 as Public Law 115-4 (Executive Office of the President, 2017). The SEC adopted a new rule on December 16, 2020. The new rule defines a "project" at the national and major subnational level and adds conditional exemptions. Under it, the first reports are due after a two-year transition (SEC, 2020).
- Reversed: Mongolia's resource cash transfers (Failed or reversed, B). Mongolia began resource-financed payments for all children in 2006. It extended larger payments to all citizens in 2010 and went back to child payments only in 2012. Payments were tied to election promises rather than mineral earnings. At times they exceeded mineral revenue and were met by borrowing. Public support for direct payouts fell from a peak of 25% to under 10%, although the transfers reduced poverty and inequality (Yeung and Howes, 2015b). The authors concluded that the scheme largely failed because of design and implementation flaws. They also concluded that this one case should not rule out the approach (Yeung and Howes, 2015a).
- Failed: World Bank-backed oil revenue management in Chad (Failed or reversed, B). As part of the Chad-Cameroon oil pipeline project, Chad passed a Law on Revenue Management in December 1998. The law set up an oversight commission that included civil society members. But in December 2005 Parliament loosened the limits on using oil revenue for general spending, and the World Bank suspended loan disbursements (EIB, n.d.). On September 5, 2008, Chad paid off early the remaining $65.7 million of a $140.7 million loan. On September 9 the World Bank ended the arrangement. The World Bank said Chad had not set aside oil revenue for local communities, health, and education as agreed (Reuters, 2008).
Sources cited on this page
- Sachs, J. D., & Warner, A. M. (2001). The curse of natural resources. European Economic Review, 45, 827-838. C Limited: contested
- Lei, Y.-H., & Michaels, G. (2014). Do giant oilfield discoveries fuel internal armed conflicts? Journal of Development Economics, 110, 139-157. DOI B Moderate
- Mehlum, H., Moene, K., & Torvik, R. (2006). Institutions and the resource curse. The Economic Journal, 116(508), 1-20. DOI C Limited
- Smith, B. (2015). The resource curse exorcised: Evidence from a panel of countries. Journal of Development Economics, 116, 57-73. DOI Reports: Cust, J., and Mihalyi, D. (2017). Evidence for a presource curse? Oil discoveries, elevated expectations, and growth disappointments. OxCarre Working Paper 193, University of Oxford B Moderate: (Smith 2015). Cust and Mihalyi (2017) B at most, as an unreviewed working paper
- Ma, L., Graham, D. J., & Stettler, M. E. J. (2021). Has the ultra low emission zone in London improved air quality? Environmental Research Letters, 16, 124001. link B Moderate
- Jones, D., & Marinescu, I. (2022). The labor market impacts of universal and permanent cash transfers: Evidence from the Alaska Permanent Fund. American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 14(2), 315-340. link B Moderate
- Lopez-Cazar, I., Papyrakis, E., & Pellegrini, L. (2021). The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) and corruption in Latin America: Evidence from Colombia, Guatemala, Honduras, Peru, and Trinidad and Tobago. Resources Policy, 70, 101907. link C Limited
- Moss, T., Lambert, C., & Majerowicz, S. (2015). Oil to cash: Fighting the resource curse through cash transfers. Center for Global Development. link C Limited
- Papyrakis, E., Rieger, M., & Gilberthorpe, E. (2017). Corruption and the extractive industries transparency initiative. Journal of Development Studies, 53(2), 295-309. link C Limited
- Rustad, S. A., Le Billon, P., & Lujala, P. (2017). Has the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative been a success? Identifying and evaluating EITI goals. Resources Policy, 51, 151-162. link C Limited
- Yeung, Y., & Howes, S. (2015a). Resources-to-cash: A cautionary tale from Mongolia (Development Policy Centre Discussion Paper No. 42). Australian National University. link C Limited
- Apeti, A. E., Basdevant, O., & Salins, V. (2023). Do fiscal rules foster fiscal discipline in resource-rich countries? (IMF Working Paper No. 2023/088). International Monetary Fund. link C Limited
- Avis, E., Ferraz, C., & Finan, F. (2018). Do government audits reduce corruption? Estimating the impacts of exposing corrupt politicians. Journal of Political Economy, 126(5), 1912-1964. link B Moderate
- Brollo, F., Nannicini, T., Perotti, R., & Tabellini, G. (2013). The political resource curse. American Economic Review, 103(5), 1759-1796. link B Moderate
- Caselli, F., & Michaels, G. (2013). Do oil windfalls improve living standards? Evidence from Brazil. American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 5(1), 208-238. link B Moderate
- Céspedes, L. F., & Velasco, A. (2014). Was this time different? Fiscal policy in commodity republics. Journal of Development Economics, 106, 92-106. link C Limited
- Havranek, T., Horvath, R., & Zeynalov, A. (2016). Natural resources and economic growth: A meta-analysis. World Development, 88, 134-151. link B Moderate
- Heinemann, F., Moessinger, M.-D., & Yeter, M. (2018). Do fiscal rules constrain fiscal policy? A meta-regression-analysis. European Journal of Political Economy, 51, 69-92. link B Moderate
- Jones, H. P., Holmes, N. D., Butchart, S. H. M., Tershy, B. R., Kappes, P. J., Corkery, I., et al. (2016). Invasive mammal eradication on islands results in substantial conservation gains. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 113(15), 4033-4038. link B Moderate
Every source for this factor is listed on the environmental factor page.