Custodes Futurifor the advancement of humanity

Misaligned incentives and short-termism

Misaligned incentives and short-termism is a barrier to human progress within the economic factors. The evidence for it, and the methods proposed to address it, follow.

Quarterly earnings pressure and election cycles reward short-term results more than long-term research, infrastructure, and climate investment.

Evidence

  • Executive survey. A survey asked 401 financial executives and held 20 interviews. In it, 78% said they would give up economic value to smooth reported earnings. Many said they would delay valuable projects to meet short-term targets (Graham, Harvey, and Rajgopal, 2005).
  • Public versus private firms. A study compared matched U.S. firms. Private firms invested about 6.8% of total assets a year. Public firms of similar size in the same industry invested about 3.7%. Private firms were also about four times more responsive to new investment opportunities. In the study, firms invested more in the five years before going public than after (Asker, Farre-Mensa, and Ljungqvist, 2015).
  • Limits. The survey measures what executives said they would do, not decisions anyone observed. The firm comparison assumes private firms face less short-term pressure. Later studies using other data found public firms invest as much or more (Gilje and Taillard, 2016, Feldman et al., 2021). So the finding is debated.

What can be done

Actions rated on the strength-rating scale (A strong and replicated, B solid but limited, C weak or debated, D contested or failed), applied to the specific claim made.

  • Shareholder votes on executive pay (B). The UK began to require advisory "say on pay" votes. After that, firms that received negative votes removed pay practices criticized as rewards for failure, such as generous severance contracts. These firms also made pay more sensitive to poor performance (Ferri and Maber, 2013).
  • Performance pay tied to measured results, when well designed (B for the India trial, B for no effect in New York City). A randomized trial covered rural government primary schools in Andhra Pradesh, India. Students in schools whose teachers received performance pay scored 0.27 standard deviations higher in math and 0.17 in language after two years. The trial found no adverse effects (Muralidharan and Sundararaman, 2011). Another randomized trial covered over 200 New York City schools. In that trial, school-wide bonuses had no effect on achievement, attendance, or graduation (Fryer, 2013). So results depend on design and setting.
  • Make long-term saving the default. See "Loss aversion and status quo bias" in the psychological factors for automatic enrollment and "Present bias" in the psychological factors for automatic escalation of savings.
  • Not shown to work: pay-for-performance for health care providers (B). A systematic review of 69 studies found low-strength evidence of short-term (2 to 3 years) improvements in processes of care in outpatient settings. But the review found no consistent effect on intermediate health outcomes. It also found insufficient evidence of any effect on patient health (Mendelson et al., 2017).

Proposed and experimental methods

Methods that are proposed, under trial, approved in some places, or tried and then failed. Each shows a stage label and an evidence rating. A stage label shows how far a method has progressed, not whether it works. The stage labels are explained on the economic factor page.

  • Ending mandatory quarterly reporting (In wide use, contested, C). The UK removed the requirement for listed companies to publish quarterly interim statements from November 7, 2014. This came ahead of an EU-wide change (FCA, 2014). A study of 471 UK companies found that 45 (about 10%) stopped quarterly reporting by the end of 2015. The same study found that reporting frequency had no material effect on corporate investment (Pozen, Nallareddy, and Rajgopal, 2017). In contrast, studies of increases in reporting frequency found different results. One found an "economically large" decline in investment among U.S. firms between 1950 and 1970 (Kraft, Vashishtha, and Venkatachalam, 2018). Another found more short-term manipulation of real activities among EU firms required to report quarterly (Ernstberger et al., 2017). On May 5, 2026, the U.S. SEC proposed letting companies file semiannual instead of quarterly reports, with comments due July 6, 2026 (Deloitte, 2026).
  • Long-Term Stock Exchange (Approved but not scaled, C). A U.S. stock exchange whose listed companies must publish policies on important stakeholders, environmental impact, and how executive and board pay links to long-term goals. It opened around September 2020. Its first listings, Twilio and Asana, began on August 26, 2021 as dual listings alongside the NYSE (Harty, 2021). Twilio delisted in 2022. In May 2023, ThredUp became only the second company then listed (CNBC, 2023). No study of effects on company behavior was found.
  • Not shown to help: Extra votes for long-term shareholders by default (Approved but not scaled, B). France's 2014 Florange Act gives double voting rights to shares held for at least two years, unless a company votes to opt out. A study found that at firms that adopted these rights by default, long-term foreign institutional ownership fell and insider or family ownership rose. The same study found that these firms underperformed on stock returns and on environmental and social measures compared with firms that opted out (Bourveau, Brochet, and Garel, 2022).

Sources cited on this page

  1. Graham, J. R., Harvey, C. R., & Rajgopal, S. (2005). The economic implications of corporate financial reporting. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 40(1-3), 3-73. DOI B Moderate
  2. Asker, J., Farre-Mensa, J., & Ljungqvist, A. (2015). Corporate investment and stock market listing: a puzzle? Review of Financial Studies, 28(2), 342-390. DOI C Limited
  3. Bourveau, T., Brochet, F., & Garel, A. (2022). The capital market consequences of tenure-based voting rights: Evidence from the Florange Act. Management Science, 68(12), 9107-9128. link B Moderate
  4. Ernstberger, J., Link, B., Stich, M., & Vogler, O. (2017). The real effects of mandatory quarterly reporting. The Accounting Review, 92(5), 33-60. link C Limited
  5. Harty, D. (2021, August 26). Silicon Valley's Long-Term Stock Exchange finally lists its first companies: Twilio and Asana. Fortune. link B Moderate
  6. Kraft, A., Vashishtha, R., & Venkatachalam, M. (2018). Frequent financial reporting and managerial myopia. The Accounting Review, 93(2), 249-275. link B Moderate: (changed from C on October 9, 2026)
  7. Pozen, R. C., Nallareddy, S., & Rajgopal, S. (2017). Impact of reporting frequency on UK public companies. CFA Institute Research Foundation. link C Limited
  8. Ferri, F., & Maber, D. A. (2013). Say on pay votes and CEO compensation: Evidence from the UK. Review of Finance, 17(2), 527-563. link B Moderate
  9. Fryer, R. G. (2013). Teacher incentives and student achievement: Evidence from New York City public schools. Journal of Labor Economics, 31(2), 373-407. link B Moderate
  10. Mendelson, A., Kondo, K., Damberg, C., Low, A., Motúapuaka, M., Freeman, M., et al. (2017). The effects of pay-for-performance programs on health, health care use, and processes of care: A systematic review. Annals of Internal Medicine, 166(5), 341-353. link B Moderate
  11. Muralidharan, K., & Sundararaman, V. (2011). Teacher performance pay: Experimental evidence from India. Journal of Political Economy, 119(1), 39-77. link B Moderate

Every source for this factor is listed on the economic factor page.