Slowing research productivity
Slowing research productivity is a barrier to human progress within the economic factors. The evidence for it, and the methods proposed to address it, follow.
Research productivity is declining. Keeping computer chip progress on pace now takes far more researchers than in the early 1970s (Bloom et al., 2020).
Evidence
- Chip density. The number of researchers needed to keep doubling chip density rose to more than 18 times the number needed in the early 1970s (Bloom et al., 2020).
- Burden of knowledge. As knowledge builds up, age at first invention, specialization, and teamwork all rise (Jones, 2009).
- Critique. Critics question the measures of idea output used in the productivity studies. The authors have responded (Bloom et al., 2020).
What can be done
Actions rated on the strength-rating scale (A strong and replicated, B solid but limited, C weak or debated, D contested or failed), applied to the specific claim made.
- Context: A review of innovation policy concluded that R&D tax credits and direct public funding are the most productive tools in the short run. The review also concluded that expanding the supply of scientists and engineers, for example by relaxing immigration rules, is likely more effective in the longer run (Bloom, Van Reenen, and Williams, 2019).
- Public funding of basic research (B). One study used quirks in NIH peer review rules that shift funding across research areas. It found that each additional $10 million of NIH funding led to a net increase of 2.3 private-sector patents (Azoulay et al., 2019). Another study looked at individual scientists. It found that winning an NIH research grant worth about $1.7 million produced only about one additional publication over five years, a 7% increase. This is possibly because unfunded researchers find other funding (Jacob and Lefgren, 2011).
- R&D tax incentives for firms (B). A regression discontinuity design used a change in the UK's size thresholds for R&D tax relief. It found significant effects on R&D and quality-adjusted patenting that lasted up to seven years. It also found spillovers to technologically close firms, and larger effects among financially constrained firms (Dechezleprêtre et al., 2023).
- Admitting skilled scientists and inventors from abroad (B for field-level invention, B for no firm-level gain from H-1B lotteries). Jewish chemists dismissed in Nazi Germany emigrated. After that, patenting by U.S. inventors rose 31% in their fields, mainly because new researchers entered those fields (Moser, Voena, and Waldinger, 2014). Higher H-1B visa admissions raised science and engineering employment in dependent cities and firms. They also raised patenting there by inventors with Indian and Chinese names. No displacement of natives was found (Kerr and Lincoln, 2010). However, firms that won extra H-1B visas in lotteries saw insignificant and at most modest effects on innovation. In those firms, each visa crowded out about 1.5 other workers (Doran, Gelber, and Isen, 2022).
- Open access to research materials and data (B). Some biological materials were moved into a public resource center that certifies and distributes them. These materials received more follow-on research than comparable materials (Furman and Stern, 2011). Some genes were held under the private firm Celera's short-term intellectual property. These genes saw 20 to 30% less later research and product development than genes in the public domain (Williams, 2013).
- Limit patents that block follow-on research, by field (B). One study used random assignment of judges at the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. It found that patent invalidation raised later citations to the patent by 50% on average. But this held only in computers, electronics, and medical instruments, and only when large firms' patents were invalidated (Galasso and Schankerman, 2015). Gene patents on average had no quantitatively important effect on follow-on innovation (Sampat and Williams, 2019). So blanket weakening of patents is not supported.
Proposed and experimental methods
Methods that are proposed, under trial, approved in some places, or tried and then failed. Each shows a stage label and an evidence rating. A stage label shows how far a method has progressed, not whether it works. The stage labels are explained on the economic factor page.
- Funding people for the long term instead of short projects (Approved but not scaled, B). Howard Hughes Medical Institute investigators receive long-term support that tolerates early failure. A study found that they produced high-impact papers "at a much higher rate" than similarly accomplished NIH-funded scientists with short review cycles. The study also found that they shifted toward more novel lines of research (Azoulay, Graff Zivin, and Manso, 2011). The comparison relies on statistical matching, not random assignment, and HHMI selects very strong scientists.
- ARPA-style agencies (Approved but not scaled, B). These give program managers wide freedom to design programs, pick projects, and stop those that miss milestones (Azoulay et al., 2019). Among 2010 cleantech startups, the 25 funded by the U.S. energy agency ARPA-E patented more than all comparison groups. The same study found they did better in business than rejected applicants, but not better than other cleantech startups (Goldstein et al., 2020). Reviewers noted ARPA-E had yet to show DARPA-scale wins (Azoulay et al., 2019). Newer copies include the UK's ARIA, created by an Act passed on February 24, 2022 (UK Parliament, 2022). They also include the U.S. health agency ARPA-H, given $1 billion on March 15, 2022 for its first three years (ARPA-H, n.d.). ARIA was allocated £800 million from the 2021 to 2022 financial year through the 2025 to 2026 financial year (Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy, 2022). The June 2025 Spending Review gave ARIA at least £1 billion to scale it up (HM Treasury, 2025). Neither ARIA nor ARPA-H has published outcome evaluations.
- Partial lottery grant funding (Approved but not scaled, C). Proposals that pass a quality screen are funded at random. The aim is to cut reviewer bias and wasted effort. New Zealand's Health Research Council funds its Explorer Grants (NZD 150,000 for up to two years, about 2% of its spending) this way. In a survey with a 39% response rate, 63% of applicants found randomization acceptable for these grants and 25% did not. In the same survey, only 40% favored it for other grants (Liu et al., 2020). The Swiss National Science Foundation piloted drawing lots among tied proposals near the funding line in its Postdoc.Mobility fellowships from 2018 to 2020. It allowed the method in all its schemes from 2021. It used the method for 9 of 278 project proposals evaluated in March 2021 (Swiss National Science Foundation, 2021). No study yet compares the research produced with that from peer review alone.
- Very fast grants (Early trial, C). During the COVID-19 pandemic, Fast Grants raised over $50 million. It made over 260 grants from more than 6,000 applications, with first-round decisions within 48 hours. The founders surveyed grantees. In that survey, 64% said the work would not have happened without the grant. In the same survey, 78% said they would change their research program "a lot" if funding were unconstrained (Collison, Cowen, and Hsu, 2021). The evidence is self-reported and comes from the program's own founders.
- Focused research organizations (Theoretical, C). These are proposed nonprofit start-ups. They would take on mid-scale, time-limited projects, such as building a tool or dataset, that academia, venture capital, and government labs leave undone (Marblestone et al., 2022). No outcome evaluation was found.
- AI tools for science (In wide use, B). The AlphaFold system predicted protein structures with accuracy competitive with experimental structures in a majority of cases in the CASP14 assessment. This task had been an open problem for more than 50 years (Jumper et al., 2021). Whether such tools raise overall research productivity has not been measured well (see the next entry).
- Not shown to help: Claimed evidence that AI raised discovery in corporate research (Failed or reversed, D). A widely discussed 2024 preprint, "Artificial Intelligence, Scientific Discovery, and Product Innovation," reported large gains from an AI tool in a research lab. In May 2025, after an internal review, MIT stated that it had no confidence in the provenance, reliability, or validity of the data. MIT asked for the paper to be withdrawn from arXiv and from the journal to which it had been submitted (MIT Economics, 2025).
Sources cited on this page
- Bloom, N., Jones, C. I., Van Reenen, J., & Webb, M. (2020). Are ideas getting harder to find? American Economic Review, 110(4), 1104-1144. AEA B Moderate
- Williams, J. C., Lambert, S. J., Kesavan, S., Fugiel, P. J., Ospina, L. A., Rapoport, E. D., et al. (2018). Stable scheduling study report. WorkLife Law. link C Limited
- Azoulay, P., Fuchs, E., Goldstein, A., & Kearney, M. (2019). Funding breakthrough research: Promises and challenges of the "ARPA model". In J. Lerner & S. Stern (Eds.), Innovation Policy and the Economy, 19, 69-96. University of Chicago Press. link B Moderate
- Azoulay, P., Graff Zivin, J. S., & Manso, G. (2011). Incentives and creativity: Evidence from the academic life sciences. RAND Journal of Economics, 42(3), 527-554. link B Moderate
- Collison, P., Cowen, T., & Hsu, P. (2021, June 15). What we learned doing Fast Grants. Future. link C Limited
- Goldstein, A., Doblinger, C., Baker, E., & Anadón, L. D. (2020). Patenting and business outcomes for cleantech startups funded by the Advanced Research Projects Agency-Energy. Nature Energy, 5(10), 803-810. link B Moderate
- Jumper, J., Evans, R., Pritzel, A., Green, T., Figurnov, M., Ronneberger, O., et al. (2021). Highly accurate protein structure prediction with AlphaFold. Nature, 596(7873), 583-589. link B Moderate: (A for structure prediction accuracy)
- Liu, M., Choy, V., Clarke, P., Barnett, A., Blakely, T., & Pomeroy, L. (2020). The acceptability of using a lottery to allocate research funding: A survey of applicants. Research Integrity and Peer Review, 5, 3. link C Limited
- Marblestone, A., Gamick, A., Kalil, T., Martin, C., Cvitkovic, M., & Rodriques, S. G. (2022). Unblock research bottlenecks with non-profit start-ups. Nature, 601(7892), 188-190. link C Limited
- Bloom, N., Van Reenen, J., & Williams, H. (2019). A toolkit of policies to promote innovation. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 33(3), 163-184. link B Moderate
- Dechezleprêtre, A., Einiö, E., Martin, R., Nguyen, K., & Van Reenen, J. (2023). Do tax incentives increase firm innovation? An RD design for R&D, patents, and spillovers. American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 15(4), 486-521. link B Moderate
- Doran, K., Gelber, A., & Isen, A. (2022). The effects of high-skilled immigration policy on firms: Evidence from visa lotteries. Journal of Political Economy, 130(10), 2501-2533. link B Moderate
- Furman, J. L., & Stern, S. (2011). Climbing atop the shoulders of giants: The impact of institutions on cumulative research. American Economic Review, 101(5), 1933-1963. link B Moderate
- Galasso, A., & Schankerman, M. (2015). Patents and cumulative innovation: Causal evidence from the courts. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 130(1), 317-369. link B Moderate
- Jacob, B. A., & Lefgren, L. (2011). The impact of research grant funding on scientific productivity. Journal of Public Economics, 95(9-10), 1168-1177. link B Moderate
- Kerr, W. R., & Lincoln, W. F. (2010). The supply side of innovation: H-1B visa reforms and U.S. ethnic invention. Journal of Labor Economics, 28(3), 473-508. link B Moderate
- Moser, P., Voena, A., & Waldinger, F. (2014). German Jewish émigrés and US invention. American Economic Review, 104(10), 3222-3255. link B Moderate
- Sampat, B., & Williams, H. L. (2019). How do patents affect follow-on innovation? Evidence from the human genome. American Economic Review, 109(1), 203-236. link B Moderate
- Williams, H. L. (2013). Intellectual property rights and innovation: Evidence from the human genome. Journal of Political Economy, 121(1), 1-27. link B Moderate
- Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy. (2022, March 14). BEIS research and development (R&D): Partner organisation allocation 2022-2023 to 2024-2025. GOV.UK. link B Moderate
Every source for this factor is listed on the economic factor page.