Custodes Futurifor the advancement of humanity

Collective action problems

Collective action problems is a barrier to human progress within the societal factors. The evidence for it, and the methods proposed to address it, follow.

Hardin (1968) described the "tragedy of the commons." Olson (1965) showed that small organized interest groups often defeat large, diffuse public interests. Ostrom (1990) documented many communities that manage shared resources well through local rules and trust.

Evidence

  • Public goods experiments. When free riders could not be punished, contributions fell to very low levels. By the final round, 53% to 75% of participants gave nothing. When participants could punish free riders, contributions rose toward full cooperation (Fehr and Gächter, 2000).
  • Real communities. A review of 91 studies of communities that manage shared resources supported most of Ostrom's design principles for successful local governance (Cox et al., 2010).
  • Strength. The commons argument is rated C for the universal claim. The evidence on local governance is rated B.

What can be done

Actions rated on the strength-rating scale (A strong and replicated, B solid but limited, C weak or debated, D contested or failed), applied to the specific claim made.

  • A global treaty with binding phase-outs, the Montreal Protocol (A for falling ozone-depleting gases, B for ozone recovery). In 2023 the treaty's scientific panel confirmed the phase-out of nearly 99% of banned ozone-depleting substances. The panel projected a return to 1980 ozone values by around 2040 for most of the world, 2045 over the Arctic, and 2066 over the Antarctic (UNEP, 2023). Observations and models show that healing of the Antarctic ozone layer had begun during the month of September, with signs of healing since 2000 (Solomon et al., 2016). Monitoring caught a breach. Global CFC-11 emissions were about 13 gigagrams a year higher after 2012 than before, pointing to unreported new production (Montzka et al., 2018). Emissions from eastern China returned to pre-2013 levels by 2019 (Park et al., 2021). A modeling study estimated that without the treaty, plants and soils could have held 325 to 690 billion tonnes less carbon by 2080 to 2099. The same study estimated 0.50 to 1.0 degrees of extra warming (Young et al., 2021).
  • Cap-and-trade pricing of carbon, the EU Emissions Trading System (B). A study used administrative data on French manufacturing firms. The study found the system led regulated firms to cut carbon dioxide emissions by 14 to 16%. It found no detectable fall in economic activity and no evidence of shifting production to unregulated firms (Colmer et al., 2025). A sector-level counterfactual estimate put total savings at about 1.2 billion tons from 2008 to 2016, or 3.8%, despite low permit prices (Bayer and Aklin, 2020). Both designs are quasi-experimental.
  • Catch shares in fisheries (C). Catch shares give fishers secure rights to a fixed portion of the total catch. A global database covered 11,135 fisheries from 1950 to 2003. In that database, fisheries with catch shares were much less likely to collapse, halting and even reversing the global trend toward collapse (Costello et al., 2008). A study of 15 North American programs found that most average ecological indicators did not change, except for fewer discards. But that study found that catch and exploitation became much more stable from year to year (Essington, 2010). Both studies are observational.
  • Contested: emission targets without enforcement, the Kyoto Protocol (D). Using synthetic control methods, one study found little evidence that major emitters with binding Kyoto targets reduced emissions (Almer and Winkler, 2017). But a matched difference-in-differences study of 170 countries from 1992 to 2009 found a measurable reducing effect (Grunewald and Martinez-Zarzoso, 2016).

Proposed and experimental methods

Methods that are proposed, under trial, approved in some places, or tried and then failed. Each shows a stage label and an evidence rating. A stage label shows how far a method has progressed, not whether it works. The stage labels are explained on the societal factor page.

  • Payments to landowners for keeping forest (Large trial, B). Paying people to protect a shared resource is one proposed answer to the tragedy of the commons. See "Earth's life-support systems" in the environmental factors for the Uganda trial. That section also covers a later study of a Ugandan payment program whose link with less deforestation faded after payments ended.
  • Community monitoring of shared resources, Ostrom-style (Large trial, B). Elinor Ostrom's work found that communities that manage commons well usually monitor use themselves. Harmonized randomized trials in six countries brought community monitoring to 400 communities, with 347 control communities. Most adopted regular monitoring within a year. A meta-analysis found modest drops in resource use and modest gains in user satisfaction and knowledge (Slough et al., 2021). Effects were modest and follow-up was about one year.
  • Climate clubs and carbon border charges (Approved but not scaled, C). A climate club is a group of countries that agree on carbon prices and charge non-members a penalty, so that free riding stops paying. Modeling found that without penalties, only coalitions with minimal emission cuts are stable. The modeling also found that small trade penalties on non-participants can sustain a large coalition with deep cuts (Nordhaus, 2015). The European Union's Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism prices the carbon in imported cement, iron and steel, aluminum, fertilizers, electricity, and hydrogen. It moved from a transitional phase to its definitive regime on January 1, 2026 (European Commission, n.d.). Its effect on other countries' climate policy has not yet been evaluated.
  • Quadratic funding for public goods (Early trial, C). In quadratic funding, a matching pool tops up projects so that the number of contributors counts more than the size of gifts. In theory, this funds public goods at the right level (Buterin et al., 2019). The authors note the design is vulnerable to collusion. The Gitcoin platform handed out over $60 million through quadratic funding. But in 2025 Gitcoin shut down its software unit and the Grants Stack tool because profitability looked unrealistic. Gitcoin kept its grants program (Kuhn, 2025). No controlled evaluation of whether quadratic funding funds better projects was found.
  • Assurance contracts with refund bonuses (Early trial, C). In an assurance contract, people pledge money that is collected only if a funding target is met. A "dominant" version also pays pledgers a bonus if the target is missed. In theory, this makes contributing the best choice whatever others do (Tabarrok, 1998). A laboratory experiment mimicked a crowdfunding platform. In it, refund bonuses substantially raised the rate of funding success when contributors could support several projects (Cason and Zubrickas, 2019). Evidence is from the laboratory only.
  • Reversed: Consumer carbon pricing in Canada (Failed or reversed, B). A carbon price makes polluters pay for a shared harm. Canada set its federal fuel charge to zero from April 1, 2025. Canada also stopped requiring provinces to keep a consumer carbon price, but kept carbon pricing for large industrial emitters (Department of Finance Canada, 2025).

Sources cited on this page

  1. Hardin, G. (1968). The tragedy of the commons. Science, 162(3859), 1243-1248. PubMed C Limited: for the universal claim
  2. Olson, M. (1965). The Logic of Collective Action. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. C Limited
  3. Ostrom, E. (1990). Governing the Commons. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. B Moderate: book, case-based design
  4. Fehr, E., & Gächter, S. (2000). Cooperation and punishment in public goods experiments. American Economic Review, 90(4), 980-994. DOI A Strong: for the decline, B for punishment as a remedy
  5. Cox, M., Arnold, G., & Villamayor Tomás, S. (2010). A review of design principles for community-based natural resource management. Ecology and Society, 15(4), 38. Ecology and Society B Moderate
  6. Martinez, J. (2026, September 19). Honduran critics call Próspera's new officials a "modern coup." The Rio Times. link B Moderate
  7. Buterin, V., Hitzig, Z., & Weyl, E. G. (2019). A flexible design for funding public goods. Management Science, 65(11), 5171-5187. link C Limited
  8. Cason, T. N., & Zubrickas, R. (2019). Donation-based crowdfunding with refund bonuses. European Economic Review, 119, 452-471. link C Limited
  9. Kuhn, D. (2025, April 25). Ethereum public goods funding protocol Gitcoin winding down its software division. The Block. link B Moderate
  10. Nordhaus, W. (2015). Climate clubs: Overcoming free-riding in international climate policy. American Economic Review, 105(4), 1339-1370. link C Limited
  11. Slough, T., Rubenson, D., Levy, R., Alpizar Rodriguez, F., Bernedo Del Carpio, M., Buntaine, M. T., et al. (2021). Adoption of community monitoring improves common pool resource management across contexts. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 118(29), e2015367118. link B Moderate
  12. Tabarrok, A. (1998). The private provision of public goods via dominant assurance contracts. Public Choice, 96(3-4), 345-362. link C Limited
  13. Almer, C., & Winkler, R. (2017). Analyzing the effectiveness of international environmental policies: The case of the Kyoto Protocol. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 82, 125-151. link D Contested
  14. Bayer, P., & Aklin, M. (2020). The European Union Emissions Trading System reduced CO2 emissions despite low prices. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 117(16), 8804-8812. link B Moderate
  15. Colmer, J., Martin, R., Muûls, M., & Wagner, U. J. (2025). Does pricing carbon mitigate climate change? Firm-level evidence from the European Union Emissions Trading System. Review of Economic Studies, 92(3), 1625-1660. link B Moderate
  16. Costello, C., Gaines, S. D., & Lynham, J. (2008). Can catch shares prevent fisheries collapse? Science, 321(5896), 1678-1681. link C Limited
  17. Essington, T. E. (2010). Ecological indicators display reduced variation in North American catch share fisheries. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 107(2), 754-759. link C Limited
  18. Grunewald, N., & Martinez-Zarzoso, I. (2016). Did the Kyoto Protocol fail? An evaluation of the effect of the Kyoto Protocol on CO2 emissions. Environment and Development Economics, 21(1), 1-22. link D Contested
  19. Montzka, S. A., Dutton, G. S., Yu, P., Ray, E., Portmann, R. W., Daniel, J. S., et al. (2018). An unexpected and persistent increase in global emissions of ozone-depleting CFC-11. Nature, 557(7705), 413-417. link A Strong
  20. Park, S., Western, L. M., Saito, T., Redington, A. L., Henne, S., Fang, X., et al. (2021). A decline in emissions of CFC-11 and related chemicals from eastern China. Nature, 590(7846), 433-437. link B Moderate
  21. Solomon, S., Ivy, D. J., Kinnison, D., Mills, M. J., Neely, R. R., & Schmidt, A. (2016). Emergence of healing in the Antarctic ozone layer. Science, 353(6296), 269-274. link B Moderate
  22. Young, P. J., Harper, A. B., Huntingford, C., Paul, N. D., Morgenstern, O., Newman, P. A., et al. (2021). The Montreal Protocol protects the terrestrial carbon sink. Nature, 596(7872), 384-388. link C Limited

Every source for this factor is listed on the societal factor page.