Custodes Futurifor the advancement of humanity

Identity-protective thinking

Identity-protective thinking is a barrier to human progress within the cultural factors. The evidence for it, and the methods proposed to address it, follow.

Kahan et al. (2012) found that people with higher science literacy were more polarized on climate risk, not less. According to the study, this was because those people used their skills to defend their group's position.

Evidence

  • Science literacy. Respondents with the highest science literacy and numeracy were the most culturally polarized on climate risk, not the least (Kahan et al., 2012).
  • Strength. The correlation has been seen elsewhere. But several replications of the related "motivated numeracy" mechanism found null results (rated C).

Why it matters: False news spreads farther and faster than true news, and the difference comes from people sharing it (Vosoughi, Roy, and Aral, 2018). This strengthens identity-protective thinking, as described in the technological factor.

What can be done

Actions rated on the strength-rating scale (A strong and replicated, B solid but limited, C weak or debated, D contested or failed), applied to the specific claim made.

  • Context: Proven actions are few. Corrections of misinformation and deep canvassing are in "Cognitive dissonance and motivated reasoning" in the psychological factors. Communicating scientific consensus and moral reframing are in the proposed methods below. Citizens' assemblies and short depolarization treatments are in the proposed methods for section 2.
  • Reward accuracy rather than loyalty when asking for facts (C, size disputed). Two national U.S. surveys tested paying for correct answers or appealing for accuracy. Both significantly reduced partisan differences in reports of economic conditions (Prior et al., 2015). Two other experiments made small payments for correct and "don't know" answers. These sharply reduced the gap between Democrats and Republicans on partisan factual questions (Bullock et al., 2015). Later experiments found that such cheerleading inflates partisan gaps only modestly. They also found that incentives did not change partisan differences in information search, and that partisans sincerely hold beliefs that favor their side (Peterson and Iyengar, 2021).
  • Not shown to work: simply exposing people to the other side's views online (B). Republicans were paid to follow a Twitter bot that showed liberal messages for a month. They became substantially more conservative. Democrats who followed a conservative bot showed slight, nonsignificant shifts (Bail et al., 2018). A field experiment included 23,377 Facebook users during the 2020 U.S. election. Cutting their exposure to like-minded sources by about one-third had no measurable effect on eight preregistered measures, including affective polarization and belief in false claims (Nyhan et al., 2023). Switching to chronological feeds did not change polarization either (Guess et al., 2023).

Proposed and experimental methods

Methods that are proposed, under trial, approved in some places, or tried and then failed. Each shows a stage label and an evidence rating. A stage label shows how far a method has progressed, not whether it works. The stage labels are explained on the cultural factor page.

  • Communicating scientific consensus (Large trial, B). This tells people the share of experts who agree, for example on climate change. A preregistered meta-analysis looked at 43 experiments on climate change, genetically modified food, and vaccination. The meta-analysis found that one exposure raised perceived consensus (g = 0.55) and belief in the scientific facts (g = 0.12). It found too few vaccination studies to draw conclusions (van Stekelenburg et al., 2022). A study in 60 countries (51,224 people) found that emphasizing scientific consensus increased climate action among people identifying as liberal. In the same study, no intervention tested increased action among those identifying as conservative (Berkebile-Weinberg et al., 2024).
  • Climate messages tested in a global intervention tournament (Large trial, B). Eleven expert-crowdsourced interventions were tested on 59,440 people in 63 countries. Effects were small and largely limited to people who were not climate skeptics. The best interventions raised belief by 2.3% (reducing psychological distance), policy support by 2.6% (writing a letter to a future-generation member), and information sharing by 12.1% (negative emotion). No intervention increased an effortful tree-planting task, and several reduced it (Vlasceanu et al., 2024).
  • Moral reframing (Early trial, C). Arguments are recast in terms of the moral values of the audience. For example, an environmental policy can be presented to conservatives as protecting purity or loyalty. Six studies looked at issues including same-sex marriage and military spending. Across these studies, reframed arguments were typically more persuasive than arguments based on the speaker's own values (Feinberg and Willer, 2015). In a preregistered field experiment, 52 canvassers for a reproductive health organization tailored appeals to the values of 1,034 voters. The experiment found large effects on interest in taking action and some evidence of changes in policy attitudes (Kalla et al., 2022). Most evidence comes from online U.S. samples.
  • Not shown to help: self-affirmation before political information (Failed or reversed, D). People first write about a value that is important to them. This is meant to reduce the threat that unwelcome evidence poses to identity. Early studies found that affirmation made judgments of a report on U.S. foreign policy less dependent on political views and increased concessions in a negotiation over abortion, but only when identity was made salient (Cohen et al., 2007). A later study pooled 11 experiments by eight independent teams. That study found no main effects and near-zero reductions in partisan bias on attitudes, factual beliefs, conspiracy beliefs, and polarization (Lyons et al., 2022). A school version also failed to replicate (see "Fixed beliefs about ability" in the psychological factors).
  • Not shown to help: correcting vaccine myths for hesitant parents (Failed or reversed, contested, C). A randomized survey experiment tested four messages with 1,759 U.S. parents. None of the four messages, including refuting the MMR and autism claim, increased intent to vaccinate a future child. In that experiment, the refutation reduced intent among parents with the least favorable attitudes (Nyhan et al., 2014). Five later experiments covered 52 polarized issues with more than 10,100 people. These experiments found no backfire for any issue, so corrections usually move factual beliefs even if they do not change behavior (Wood and Porter, 2019). Prebunking and fact-checking are covered in "Cognitive dissonance and motivated reasoning" in the psychological factors.

Sources cited on this page

  1. Kahan, D. M., et al. (2012). The polarizing impact of science literacy and numeracy on perceived climate change risks. Nature Climate Change, 2, 732-735. Nature C Limited
  2. Berkebile-Weinberg, M., Goldwert, D., Doell, K. C., Van Bavel, J. J., & Vlasceanu, M. (2024). The differential impact of climate interventions along the political divide in 60 countries. Nature Communications, 15(1), 3885. link B Moderate
  3. Cohen, G. L., Sherman, D. K., Bastardi, A., Hsu, L., McGoey, M., & Ross, L. (2007). Bridging the partisan divide: Self-affirmation reduces ideological closed-mindedness and inflexibility in negotiation. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 93(3), 415-430. link D Contested
  4. Feinberg, M., & Willer, R. (2015). From gulf to bridge: When do moral arguments facilitate political influence? Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 41(12), 1665-1681. link C Limited
  5. Kalla, J. L., Levine, A. S., & Broockman, D. E. (2022). Personalizing moral reframing in interpersonal conversation: A field experiment. Journal of Politics, 84(2), 1239-1243. link C Limited
  6. Lyons, B. A., Farhart, C. E., Hall, M. P., Kotcher, J., Levendusky, M., Miller, J. M., et al. (2022). Self-affirmation and identity-driven political behavior. Journal of Experimental Political Science, 9(2), 225-240. link B Moderate
  7. Nyhan, B., Reifler, J., Richey, S., & Freed, G. L. (2014). Effective messages in vaccine promotion: A randomized trial. Pediatrics, 133(4), e835-e842. link B Moderate
  8. van Stekelenburg, A., Schaap, G., Veling, H., van 't Riet, J., & Buijzen, M. (2022). Scientific-consensus communication about contested science: A preregistered meta-analysis. Psychological Science, 33(12), 1989-2008. link B Moderate
  9. Vlasceanu, M., Doell, K. C., Bak-Coleman, J. B., Todorova, B., Berkebile-Weinberg, M. M., Grayson, S. J., et al. (2024). Addressing climate change with behavioral science: A global intervention tournament in 63 countries. Science Advances, 10(6), eadj5778. link B Moderate
  10. Wood, T., & Porter, E. (2019). The elusive backfire effect: Mass attitudes' steadfast factual adherence. Political Behavior, 41(1), 135-163. link A Strong
  11. Porter, C., & Serra, D. (2020). Gender differences in the choice of major: The importance of female role models. American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 12(3), 226-254. link C Limited: (changed from B on October 9, 2026)
  12. Bail, C. A., Argyle, L. P., Brown, T. W., Bumpus, J. P., Chen, H., Hunzaker, M. B. F., et al. (2018). Exposure to opposing views on social media can increase political polarization. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 115(37), 9216-9221. link B Moderate
  13. Bullock, J. G., Gerber, A. S., Hill, S. J., & Huber, G. A. (2015). Partisan bias in factual beliefs about politics. Quarterly Journal of Political Science, 10(4), 519-578. link C Limited
  14. Nyhan, B., Settle, J., Thorson, E., Wojcieszak, M., Barberá, P., Chen, A. Y., et al. (2023). Like-minded sources on Facebook are prevalent but not polarizing. Nature, 620(7972), 137-144. link B Moderate
  15. Peterson, E., & Iyengar, S. (2021). Partisan gaps in political information and information-seeking behavior: Motivated reasoning or cheerleading? American Journal of Political Science, 65(1), 133-147. link B Moderate
  16. Prior, M., Sood, G., & Khanna, K. (2015). You cannot be serious: The impact of accuracy incentives on partisan bias in reports of economic perceptions. Quarterly Journal of Political Science, 10(4), 489-518. link C Limited

Every source for this factor is listed on the cultural factor page.